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INTRODUCTION

The

State

interest

under

concedes Mr. Ham
the

Fourth

retains

Amendment

a diminished

to

the

United

privacy
States

Constitution and, presumably, under Article 1, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution

(Brief of Appellee at 8) .

As such, the State

cannot rely on "reasonable suspicion" as justification for the
search of Mr. Ham's refrigerator or the freezer; the State relys on
Mr. Ham's alleged consent in that regard (Brief of Appellee at 9 ) .
As argued in the lower court (R. 177-99), the State continues
to urge the Court to adopt the theory that Mr. Ham's Probation
Agreement

somehow

provides

a

ready-made

"voluntary

consent,"

authorizing

a probation

officer's

request

warrant and without reasonable suspicion.

and

search

without

This type "consent"

principle is without support and it was err for the lower court to
have found or implied consent, as a matter of law, based on the
Probation Agreement (R. 87).
Additionally, the entire chain-of-events, from the initial
search demand

to the discovery of the last

items of

evidence

seized, took place within a matter of several minutes, as opposed
to

hours.

The

record

supports

Mr.

Ham's

argument

that

no

intervening factors or events occurred which would purge the taint
of illegality from the entire sequence of events.

As long as

probation officers are allowed to conduct searches outside the
scope of

constitutional

protections,

individual

constitutional

rights will continue to be an illusory concept.
POINT I
MR. HAM'S PROBATION AGREEMENT DID NOT PROVIDE THE AUTHORITY TO
SEARCH HIS REFRIGERATOR, FREEZER, OR ANY OTHER PORTION OF HIS
RESIDENCE AND MR. HAM CERTAINLY DID NOT VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO
OR IN ANY WAY INSTIGATE THE INITIAL SEARCH REQUEST.
A Probation Agreement does not and cannot provide voluntary
consent

to

search

unless

and

until

the

officer

ascertains

a

reasonable, articulable suspicion that the probationer is, was, or
will be in violation of the terms of the Probation Agreement.

In

this case, the officers testified that there were no suspicions
whatsoever regarding Mr. Ham violating the terms of his probation
(R. 119) . Therefore, regardless of whether the search in this case
2

was as a result of a request or a demand, the conclusion that Mr.
Ham gave constitutionally effective consent was erroneous as a
matter of law.
Additionally,

the

trial

court's

conclusion

that

by

implication, Mr. Ham's consent to search the refrigerator was also
consent

to

search

the

adjacent,

erroneous, as a matter of law.

but

separate,

freezer

was

There is no support in the record

for the assumption that Agent McCullough's telling Mr. Ham he
needed to look in the refrigerator for alcohol

(R. 123) was a

statement of his intent to conduct a general alcohol check, which
naturally would include, by implication, the adjacent freezer.

If

such an assumption were correct, the search request would clearly
violate Mr. Ham's right to privacy because any location in the home
that might contain alcohol would be open to search by implication,
based on an alleged consent to search the refrigerator.
The

State

circumstances
conclusion."

argues
and

that

testimony

Mr.

Ham

"ignores

supporting

(Appellee's Brief at 10).

the

most
trial

of

the

court's

The State's allegations

here are wrong and the State simply ignores the fact that Agent
McCullough, who was doing all of the talking to Mr. Ham, testified
to the fact that he told Mr. Ham that he was going look in the
refrigerator (R. 123, 124, 142).

His testimony is devoid of any

mention of a general alcohol check or any reference to the adjacent
freezer.
Additionally,

the State argues Mr. Ham ignores the trial
3

court's findings that Mr. Ham verbally responded to a request by
Agent McCullough for the search by saying "go ahead" or words to
that effect. (Appellee's Brief at 14).

What the State fails to

mention, and the lower court failed respect, is the fact that Agent
McCullough himself testified that he basically had no idea of what
Mr. Ham said or even if Mr. Ham actually responded at all.

The

specific dialogue containing the alleged "go ahead" response went
as follows:
Q

I am going to ask you again to make sure I finish my question
before you answer. All right? How did [Mr. Ham] respond to
your statement that you needed to go in the refrigerator for
alcohol?

A

Did not respond.
I do not remember any particular
conversation, exactly what was said, that he did not have any
objection, and I believe he said go ahead, but I do not recall
specifically.

(R. 123-24) (emphasis added).
The State also ignores, and the lower courtf s findings fail to
address, the fact that according to Agent McCullough, Mr. Ham and
he conversed for less than 60 seconds before McCullough actually
commenced

his

search

of

Mr.

Ham's

refrigerator

(R.

143).

Apparently Mr. Ham was supposed to freely make an intelligent,
unequivocal and specific "voluntary consent" to the search of his
freezer, even though only the refrigerator was identified as the
target of the search, all within less than a minute.
The State argues that Mr. Ham should have reasonably known
that the demand to look in the refrigerator included the freezer
because "a reasonable person would know that both the refrigerator
4

and the freezer could be used to chill alcohol."
at 18).

(Appellee's Brief

Under the State's argument, Mr. Ham would have had to

anticipate

that

if

he

did

consent

to

the

search

of

his

refrigerator, that consent, by implication, would include any and
all locations which could conceivably hold a container of alcohol
since not all alcohol requires refrigeration.
Citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248

(1991), the State

argues that a request to search an automobile for drugs includes
all containers within the automobile that might contain drugs and,
by analogy, a request to search a refrigerator for alcohol must
include all containers within the home that might contain alcohol.
Such an analogy does not make sense. Mr. Ham concedes that if the
Court determines he actually or impliedly consented to the search
of the refrigerator, such consent would include all areas and
compartments within the refrigerator that might contain alcohol.
However, such consent can in no way imply coverage of any other
areas

since

the

demand

(or

request)

specifically

and

only

identified the refrigerator.
The State argues that the officers did not deceive or trick
Mr. Ham in procuring his consent to search, yet the State ignores
the fact that under state and federal constitutional analysis,
these officers did not have the right to search anything - they had
no reasonable suspicion that anything was wrong. Agent McCullough,
within a minute of starting his conversation, tells Mr. Ham "we
need to look in the fridge for alcohol"
5

(R. 123) .

The State

ignores the fact that in this situation, these probation officers
were

inherently

conducting

their

affairs

under

a

claim

of

authority, which in and of itself carries an element of force.
There simply is not enough convincing evidence to establish
constitutionally effective consent.

The trial court erred when it

concluded Mr. Ham voluntarily consented to the initial search, and
especially when it concluded the freezer search was consented to by
implication.
POINT II
THERE ARE NO GROUNDS TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSITION THAT
INTERVENING EVENTS PURGED THE SUBSEQUENT DISCOVERY OF
CONTRABAND FROM THE TAINT OF THE PRIOR ILLEGALITY.
The initial demand to search Mr. Ham's refrigerator, without
reasonable, articulable suspicion of a probation violation, was a
violation of Mr. Ham's constitutional

rights under Article

1,

Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and under the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.

Even if Mr. Ham's conduct is

construed as voluntary consent to search his refrigerator, failure
to locate any
expansion
suppressed.

of

illegal
the

contraband

search

illegal

in that
and

appliance makes

the

evidence

must

the
be

See, e.g. , State v. Chapman, 2 72 Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah

1995) .
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that an
illegal search cannot be "validated by what it turns up." Wong Sun
v. United States. 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).

Without violating Mr.

Ham's constitutional right to privacy, the officers would not have
6

had any reason whatsoever to believe Mr. Ham was in violation of
his probation agreement.

Therefore, locating the alcohol in the

freezer, which provided the reasonable, articulable suspicion to
expand the search even further, cannot be validated simply because
evidence establishing illegal conduct was discovered.
The State argues the final events were so attenuated from
prior illegalities that they were purged of all taint; that Mr. Ham
voluntarily consented to the final search.

However, voluntariness

is not the only factor that must be considered in determining
whether

this

consent

is

valid,

thereby

making

subsequent

discoveries admissible.
A second question that must be answered regarding the validity
of consent following police illegality is "whether the consent was
obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality .
whether

the

'taint'

of

the

Fourth

Amendment

violation

was

sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence."
State v. Thurman,
omitted).

846

P.2d

1256, 1263

(Utah 1993)

(citations

The principle underlying the exploitation test is that

the Fourth Amendment should not permit law enforcement to "ratify
their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining a consent after the
illegality has occurred."

Id.

(Citing State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d

684, 689 (Utah 1990)).
The primary goal of Arroyo was to deter police from "engaging
in illegal conduct even though that conduct may be followed by a
voluntary consent to the subsequent search."
7

Id.

In the present

case, the Agents were experienced, well trained probation officers
who knew and had a complete understanding of the state and federal
laws regarding search and seizure (R. 136).
Both Agents were familiar with the standard terminology of the
Probation Agreements, which includes an understanding that searches
would be authorized only upon the ascertainment of reasonable,
articulable suspicions of probation violations.

The egregiousness

of this misconduct and the need to deter similar occurrences of
misconduct in the future far outweighs any detriment suppression of
the evidence in this case might have upon society.
officer's

testimony

Based on the

that their search was commenced within 60

seconds of their contact with the probationer, even though they had
no suspicions of any kind regarding violations, it is obvious that
this

conduct

is

a

regular

and

accepted

practice

within

the

probation department.
It is almost impossible to believe the State's argument that
these

officers

were

not

acting

with

intentional

and

flagrant

disregard for the "reasonable suspicion" standard espoused by the
very Probation Agreement that allegedly authorized their presence
at Mr. Ham's residence.

It is equally hard to believe

these

officers, with their years of experience, actually believed they
"had complied with what the Fourth Amendment required of them
before they could legally search."
The

initial

illegality

up

(Appellee's Brief at 22).
to

the

final

discovery

of

incriminating evidence was a step by step process, each step of the
8

process linked and in no way purged of the taint from the previous
step.

Agent McCullough testified that within a minute of starting

to talk with Mr. Ham, the officers commenced their search (R. 143) .
Upon locating the alcohol in the freezer, they immediately told Mr.
Ham to accompany them while they expanded their search to the rest
of the house (R. 126, 145-46, 170).

A very brief search of the

remainder of the up-stairs was conducted, not taking "any time to
go through stuff in the upstairs at that point," and then the
officers directed Mr. Ham to show them the downstairs portion of
the house, "almost as an after thought." (R. 145-46).
Once

in the basement, the officers

immediately

located a

cooler containing beer on ice in plain sight (R. 146), then Agent
Hillam went to an adjacent room and located a mirror that allegedly
had cocaine on it, along with other contraband (R. 147), at which
time Agent Hillam immediately returned to where Mr. Ham was located
and placed him under arrest (R. 147) . Without providing a Miranda
warning, Agent Hillam began interrogating Mr. Ham and Mr. Ham told
the officers about additional drugs in the basement

(R. 163),

following which Miranda was given and further interrogations took
place (R. 131).
The record establishes there was no break in sequence, no
intervening event, no attenuation of the connections between one
step in the process to the next.

"The notion of the 'dissipation

of the taint1 attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental
consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the
9

deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its
cost." Thurman, 846 P.2d

at 1272.

(Citation omitted).

The

subsequent consent to the search down stairs is no where near the
attenuation point where the cost to society would outweigh any
deterrent effect of exclusion in this case.

Only by exclusion in

cases such as the present can the probation officers be deterred
from future conduct of the same nature.
CONCLUSION
Probation officers do not have the right to request or conduct
searches

of

property

unless

articulable
violation.

a

probationer's
and

suspicions

until
of

person,
they

some

residence,

first
type

or

ascertain

illegality

any

other

reasonable,
or

probation

In Mr. Ham's case, the officers had no suspicions, yet

they demanded

(or requested) a search of his refrigerator.

The

officers then exceeded the scope of this demand by searching a
separate appliance in the residence, which was further exploited to
the remainder of the home.
All evidence, from the initial illegal search request through
to and including post-Miranda evidence, was and is tainted by the
officers1 conduct that was initiated within 60 seconds of Mr. Ham's
conversation with Agent McCullough; all evidence is fruit of the
poisonous tree and must be suppressed accordingly.

See Wong Sun v.

United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Ham respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the trial court's suppression ruling and remand
10

the case accordingly.
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